Most of the good thrillers I seem to have watched in recent years have spies and assassins in
them for some diabolical reason. In those movies you’ll often find their
target, the Archduke of Villainess, holed up in some remote local and
the spy has to fake an identity in order to penetrate the layers of
defense. Almost without exception the spy enters the country using a
fake passport; relying upon a passport from any country other than their
own.
Like any good story, there’s enough truth to the fiction to make it
believable. Take the real-life example of the hit squad that carried out
the assassination of a Hamas official in Dubai early 2010. That squad (supposedly Israeli) used forged passports from the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Germany.
So, with that bit of non-fiction in mind, why do so many people
automatically assume that cyber-attacks sourced from IP addresses within
China are targeted, state-sponsored, attacks? Are people missing the
plot? Has the Chinese APT leapfrogged fact and splatted in to the realm of mythology already?
If you’re manning a firewall or inspecting IPS log files, you can’t
have missed noticing that there’s a whole bunch of attacks being
launched against your organization from devices hosted in China on a
near continuous basis. A sizable fraction of those attacks would be deemed “advanced”; meaning that as long as they’re more advanced than the
detection technology you happen to be reliant upon, they’re as advanced as they need to
be to get the job done.
Are these the APT’s of lore? Are these the same things that
government defense departments and contractors alike quake in their boots from?
There’s a simple way to tell. If what you’re observing in your own logs
shows the source as being from a Chinese IP address it almost certainly
isn’t.
Yes, there’s a tremendous amount of attack traffic coming from China,
but this should really be categorized as the background hum of the
modern Internet nowadays. China, as the most populous country on the planet,
isn’t exempt from having more than its fair share of Internet
scoundrels, wastrels, hackers and cyber-criminals — spanning the full
spectrum of technical capability and motivations. Even then, the traffic
originating from China may not be wholly from criminals based there —
instead it may also contain attack traffic tunneled through open proxies
and bot infected hosts within China by other international
cyber-criminals.
Mind you, when we’re talking about cyber-warfare and state-sponsored espionage, we’re not talking about a bunch of under-graduate hackers.
Just about every country I can think of with a full-time professional
military force has been investing in their cyber capabilities – both
defense and attack. While they’re not employing the crème de la crème of
professional hacking talent, they are professional and have tremendous
resources behind them, and they follow a pretty strict and well
thought-out doctrine. If you’re in the Chinese Army and have been tasked
with facilitating a particular espionage campaign or to aid a spy
mission, the last thing on earth you’re going to do is to launch or
control your assets from an IP address that can be easily traced back to
China. Anywhere else in the world is good, and an IP address in a
country that your foe is already suspicious of (or fully trusting of) is
way better.
Don’t get me wrong though, I’m not singling out the Chinese for any
particular reason other than most readers will be familiar with the
hoopla and epic proportions of Chinese APTs in the media. Any marginally competent adversary
is going to similarly launch their attacks from a foreign source if
they’re planning on maintaining deniability should the attack ever be
noticed – just like those spy tactic of using foreign passports.
So, if you’re inclined, how are you going to get access to foreign
resources that can proxy and mask your attacks? Elementary my dear
Watson, there’s a market for that. First of all there’s a whole bunch of
free and commercial anonymizing proxies , routers and VPN’s out there –
but they may not be stable enough for conducting a prolonged campaign
(and besides, they’re probably already penetrated by a number of
government entities already). Alternatively you could buy access to
already compromised systems and hijack them for your own use.
Over the last five years there have been a bunch of boutique threat
monitoring and threat feed companies springing up catering almost
exclusively to the needs of various national defense departments. While
they may offer 0-day vulnerabilities, reliable weaponized exploits and
stealthy remote access Trojans, their most valuable offering in the
world of state-sponsored espionage is arguably the feed of intelligence harvested from the sinkholes
they control. Depending upon the type of sinkhole they’re fortunate to
be operating, and which botnet or malware campaign that happened to
utilize the hijacked domain, they’re going to have access to a real-time
feed of known victim devices from around the world, copies of all the
data leached from the victims by the malware and, in some cases, the
ability to remotely control the victim device. Everything a
cyber-warfare unit is going to need to hijack and usurp control of a
foreign host, and launch their stealthy attack from.
Now, if I was say working within the cyber-warfare team of the French
Foreign Legion or perhaps the DGSE (General Directorate for External
Security) and interested in gathering secret intelligence about the
investment Chinese companies are making in sub-Sahara mineral resources,
I’d probably launch my attack from a collection of bot-infected hosts
located within US or Australian universities. The security analysts and
incident response folks working at those Chinese companies are probably
already seeing attack traffic from these sources off-and-on, so my more
specialized and targeted attack would unlikely raise suspicion. Should
the targeted attack eventually be discovered, the Chinese would simply
blame the US and Australian governments – rather than the French.
Having said all that, you’ve probably seen movies with double-agents
in them too. And it’s entirely possible that someone hair-brained enough
would argue that China launches attacks from their own IP space because
everyone knows that you shouldn’t, and therefore an assumption would be made that attacks launched from China are clearly not from the Chinese
government – while they are in fact. How very cunning. Now there’s a
twist for the next spy movie.
There is even a term for that: false flag (cfr: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_flag )
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