Which brings me to the discussion over three of the most important changes on the Internet for quite some time – all of which appear to be reaching their crescendo at the same time. While I’m silently hoping that most people are familiar with the three, I suspect that very few people are as up to speed as they need to be. Which three? IPv6, Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) and DNSSEC.
Incremental testing and roll-outs of these three technologies has been ongoing for way too long – but it seems that they’re all hitting the Internet (and consequently the Enterprise) at round about the same time. DNSSEC, the late starter, would appear to be in pole position to reach widespread deployment first. Meanwhile IPv6, a technology that has been on the drawing board for over a decade, is finally finding its feet as prophets predict the end of the Internet as old-style IPv4 addresses run out.
From a security perspective, DNSSEC is most strongly affiliated with “making the Internet better” – that is to say, it was designed to overcome many of the security weaknesses and failures of past DNS specifications, implementations and deployments – in particular, certain types of attacks directed at cache poisoning. For enterprise environments, DNSSEC strengthens the overall security of DNS servers and will make them more resilient to many of the attacks that have plagued the Internet for the last couple of decades. There is even talk about how this technology, once deployed widely and mandated for Internet use, will help reduce persistent threats such as spam and phishing. That said, it’s one of the technologies I’d class as important from a security perspective, but isn’t really going to affect the criminals adversely. Great defensive advances from a hacker/cyber-war perspective, much less so from a criminals perspective.
The two other technologies – IPv6 and IDNs – on the other hand are much more interesting from a security and criminal perspective, as they potentially open the doors to many new forms of abuse and attack vectors. I use the term “potentially”, but in reality I mean that they will obviously enable new forms of attacks and enhance many of the existing attacks that have plagued the Internet throughout the last decade.
I’m not going to go in to the technical details of these technologies – if you’re interested in finding out more about them, go HERE for the IPv6 information and HERE for the IDNs information. What I will point out though is that these two technologies have a far reaching impact upon both the vectors through which the bad guys can attack an enterprise through, and upon the security technologies used to detect and analyze subsequent attacks.
IDNs and IPv6 shouldn’t be thought of as an upgrade to existing Internet standards or networks – i.e. migrating from Internet 1.0 to 2.0 – but could conceivably be thought of as a parallel universe where things are kind of familiar, but different at the same time.
How could I describe the changes between IPv4 & IPv6 and the traditional domain system & IDNs? By way of analogy, think about good, old fashioned, radio. The traditional domain name and registration processes (with all the 2LD and 3LD definitions), along with the traditional IPv4 networks can be thought of as operating over AM Radio. Meanwhile IDNs and IPv6 can be thought of as FM Radio. That is to say, moving from one to the other isn’t the same as just turning the dial left or right in search of a new station or frequency. Rather, we’re talking about a kind of change that requires a different kind of receiver – and without the right receiver (AM or FM) you’re not going to be able to pick up the new channels.
The analogy only goes so far though. But just like the electromagnetic waves of radio transmissions are undetectable without the correct receiver and the right tuning, the same concepts apply to IPv6 and IDNs advancements. Without ensuring that your security technologies can actually handle these changes to the Internet or enterprise network, there’s no way you’re going to be able to detect them being abused for malicious and criminal purposes.
A likely question from readers is going to be “Are the bad guys abusing these technologies already?” From casual observation and perhaps being tainted by too many years having to think and act out as one of the bad guys, the answer has got to be “Yes”. But, on the plus side, not to a noticeable or damaging level yet. The bad guys are still in an experimental and prototyping phase – examining the potential vectors for abuse – and largely waiting for the time when it becomes worthwhile launching meaningful attacks that abuse IPv6 and IDN rollouts. I have no doubt that many of the criminal service providers are priming themselves for the new revenue models and competitive edge.
The question I’d leave for readers in return though is “do you think your security systems are capable of detecting and reporting abuse of IPv6 and IDNs?”
Think about it. Which systems and processes do you have in place capable of detecting a brand new phishing site hosted as www.eBay.com where the “B” is the Cyrillic letter Ve and just happens to look exactly like the ANSI “B” character? and what if the SSL/TLS certificate matches, etc. Would you notice that a botnet agent is propagating and establishing peer-to-peer relationships between infected hosts within your own organization over IPv6? Would you be able to scan for, and uncover, a botnet Command and Control service running on a compromised host with an IP address of 2001:db8:85a3::8a2e:370:7334?
While DNSSEC works to close down several vulnerabilities, IPv6 and IDNs open the doors for additional forms of attack and attack vectors. Now would be a great time to double-check that your existing systems are capable of handling these changes – particularly new internationalized domain names such as www.günterollmann.com :-)