Tuesday, October 8, 2019

Cloud is Creating Security and Network Convergence

Network Security Expertise is Needed More Than Ever Inside Security Operations Centers and on DevOps Teams

Digital transformation forces many changes to a business as it migrates to the public cloud. One of the most poorly examined is the convergence of network and security administration tasks and responsibilities in the public cloud.


On premises, the division between roles is pretty clear. The physical nature of networking infrastructure – the switches, routers, firewall appliances, network taps, WiFi hubs, and miles upon miles of cable – makes it easy to separate responsibilities. If it has power, stuff connects to it, it routes packets, and weighs more than 5 pounds, it probably belongs to the networking team.

In the cloud, where network connectivity features are defined by policies and code, the network is ephemeral. More importantly, the network is a security boundary – protecting services, applications, and data.

For many organizations, an early steppingstone in their digital transformation is virtualizing all their on-premises applications, infrastructure, and administrative and monitoring processes. Operating almost entirely within an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) mode, previously favored network vendors provide virtual machine (VM) versions of their on-premises networking and security appliances – effectively making the transition to public cloud the equivalent of shifting to a new co-hosting datacenter.

This early stage takes very little advantage of public cloud. VMs remain implanted in statically defined networking architectures and old-style network monitoring remains largely the same. However, as organizations embrace continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD), DevOps, serverless functions, and other cloud-native services, the roles of network and security administrator converge rapidly. At that point, network topology ceases to be the grid that servers and applications must snap to. Instead, leveraging the software defined network (SDN) nature of the cloud, the network becomes ephemeral – continuously defined, created, and disposed of in code.

With zero trust running core to modern CI/CD and DevOps security practices in the cloud, SDN has become a critical framework for protecting data, identities, and access controls.

Today, a cloud security architect, security analyst, or compliance officer cannot fulfill their security responsibilities without being a cloud network expert too. And, vice versa, a systems architect or network engineer cannot bring value to cloud operations without being comfortable wearing size 15 cloud security shoes.

For networking professionals transitioning to the cloud, I offer the following advice:

  • Partner extensively with your peers on the security team – they too are a transformation and are destined to become network experts.
  • Plan to transition from VM infested IaaS environments as fast as possible to cloud-native services which are easier to understand, manage, and deploy.
  • Become familiar with the portal management experience of each new network (security) service, but plan on day-to-day management being at the command line.
  • Brush up your scripting language expertise and get comfortable with code management tools. In a CI/CD workplace GitHub and its ilk are where the real action happens.
  • Throw out the old inhibitions of consuming valuable network bandwidth with event logs and streaming service health telemetry. In the age of cloud SIEM, data is king and storage is cheap, and trouble-shooting ephemeral network problems requires both in abundance.
  • Forget thumbing through network security books to learn. Training is all online. Watch the cloud provider’s workshop videos and test the lessons in real-time online.

With so many cloud critical controls existing at the network layer, network security expertise is needed more than ever inside security operations centers and on DevOps teams.

The faster in-house network administrators can transition to becoming public cloud network security engineers, architects, or analysts, the faster their organizations can implement digital transformation.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - October 8, 2019

Tuesday, September 10, 2019

Stop Using CVSS to Score Risk

The mechanics of prioritizing one vulnerability’s business risk over another has always been fraught with concern. What began as securing business applications and infrastructure from full-disclosure bugs a couple of decades ago, has grown to encompass vaguely referenced flaws in insulin-pumps and fly-by-wire aircraft with lives potentially hanging in the balance.

The security industry has always struggled to “score” the significance of the threat posed by a newly discovered vulnerability and recent industry practices have increased pressure on how this should be done.

With the growth of bug bounty programs and vertical industry specialization at boutique security consultancies, vulnerability discoveries with higher severity often translate directly into greater financial reward for the discoverers. As such, there is immense pressure to increase both the significance and perceived threat posed by the vulnerability. In a growing number of cases, marketing teams will conduct world-wide campaigns to alert, scare, and drive business to the company.

It’s been close to 25 years since the first commercial vulnerability scanners started labeling findings in terms of high, medium, and low severity. Even back then, security professionals stumbled by confusing severity with “risk.”

At the turn of the last century as companies battled millennium bugs, the first generation of professional penetration testing consultancies started to include factors such as “exploitability,” “likelihood of exploitation,” and “impact of exploitation” in to their daily reports and end-of-engagement reports as way of differentiating between vulnerabilities with identical severity levels. Customers loved the additional detail, yet the system of scoring was highly dependent on the skills and experience of the consultant tabulating and reporting the results. While the penetration testing practices of 20 years ago have been rebranded Red Teaming and increasingly taken in-house, risk scoring vulnerabilities remains valuable – but continues to be more art than science.

Perhaps the most useful innovation in terms of qualifying the significance of a new vulnerability (or threat) has been the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). It’s something I feel lucky to have contributed to and helped drive across products when I led X-Force at Internet Security Systems (acquired by IBM in 2006). As the (then) premier automated scanner and managed vulnerability scanning vendor, the development and inclusion of CVSS v1 scoring back in 2005 changed the industry – and opened up new contentions in the quantitative weighting of vulnerability features that are still wrestled with today in CVSS version 3.1.


CVSS is intended to summarize the severity of vulnerabilities in the context of the software or device – not the systems that are dependent upon the software or device. As a result, it worries me deeply when I hear that CVSS scores are wrongly being used to score the risk a vulnerability poses to an organization, device manufacturer, or end user.

That misconception was captured recently in an article arguing that vulnerability scoring flaws put patients’ lives at risk. On one hand, the researchers point out that though the CVSS score for their newly disclosed vulnerability was only middling (5.8 out of 10), successful exploitation could enable an attacker to adjust medicine dosage levels and potentially kill a patient. And, on the other hand, medical device manufacturers argue that because the score was relatively low, the vulnerability may not require an expedited fix and subsequent regulatory alerting.

As far as CVSS in concerned, both the researchers and medical device vendor were wrong. CVSS isn’t, and should never be used as, a risk score.

Many bright minds over two decades have refined CVSS scoring elements to make it more accurate and useful as a severity indicator, but have stalled in searching for ways to stretch environmental factors and the knock-on impacts of a vulnerability into quantifiable elements for determining “risk.” Today, CVSS doesn’t natively translate to a risk score – and it may never because every industry assesses risk differently and each business has its own risk factor qualifications that an external party won’t know.

I would caution any bug hunter, security analyst, software vendor, or device manufacturer to not rely on CVSS as the pointy end of the stick for prioritizing remediation. It is an important variable in the risk calculation – but it is not an adequate risk qualifier by itself.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - September 10, 2019

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

Harnessing Stunt Hacking for Enterprise Defense

Make Sure You Understand the Root Cause of the Vulnerabilities or Attack Vectors Behind the Next Over-Hyped Stunt Hack

Every year, at least one mediocre security vulnerability surprisingly snatches global media attention, causing CISOs and security researchers to scratch their heads and sigh “who cares?”

Following a trail of overly-hyped and publicized security bugs in smart ovens, household fridges, digital teddy bears, and even multi-function toilet-bidets, the last few weeks have seen digital SLR camera vulnerabilities join to the buzz list. Yet, this latest hack boils down to a set of simple WiFi enabled file-sharing flaws in a mid-priced camera that allowed researchers to demonstrate specially crafted ransomware attacks. It is not an obvious or imminent threat to most enterprise networks.

Love it or loathe it, stunt hacking and over-hyped bugs are part of modern information security landscape. While the vast majority of such bugs represent little threat to business in reality, they stir up legitimate questions. Does marketing security hacks to a fever-pitch cause more harm than good? Are stunts a distraction or amplifier for advancing enterprise security?


There is little doubt within the security researcher community that a well-staged vulnerability disclosure can quickly advance stalled conversations with reluctant vendors. Staged demonstrations and a flare for showmanship had the healthcare industry hopping as security flaws embedded in surgically implanted insulin pumps and heart defibrillators became overnight dinner-table discussions and murder plots in TV dramas. A couple years later, prime time news stories of researchers taking control of a reporter’s car – remotely steering the vehicle and disabling breaking – opened eyes worldwide to the threats underlying autonomous vehicles, helping to create new pillars of valued cyber security research.

Novel technologies and new devices draw security researchers like moths to a flame – and that tends to benefit the community as a whole. But it is often difficult for those charged with defending the enterprise to turn awareness into meaningful actions. A CFO who’s been sitting on a proposal for managed vulnerability scanning because the ROI arguments were a little flimsy may suddenly approve it on reading news of how the latest step-tracking watch inadvertently reveals the locations of secret military bases around the world.

In a world of over-hyped bugs, stunt hacking, and branded vulnerability disclosures, my advice to CISOs is to make security lemonade by finding practical next steps to take:

  1. Look beyond the device and learn from the root cause of the security failing. Hidden under most of the past medical device hacks were fundamental security flaws involving outdated plain-text network protocols and passwords, unsigned patching and code execution, replay attacks and, perhaps most worrying, poorly thought through mechanisms to fix or patch devices in the field. The outdated and unauthenticated Picture Transfer Protocol (PTP) was the root cause of the SLR camera hack.
  2. Use threat models to assess your enterprise resilience to recently disclosed vulnerabilities. The security research community waxes and wanes on attack vectors from recent bug disclosures, so it often pays to follow which areas of research are most in vogue. The root cause vulnerabilities of the most recent hacks serve as breadcrumbs for other researchers hunting for similar vulnerabilities in related products. For this reason, build threat models for all form factors the root flaw can affect.
  3. Learn, but don’t obsess, over vulnerable device categories and practice appropriate responses. At the end of the day, a WiFi-enabled digital SLR camera is another unauthenticated removable data storage unit that can potentially attach to the corporate network. As such, the response should be similar to any other roaming exfiltration device. Apply the controls for preventing a visitor or employee roaming a datacenter with a USB key in hand to digital SLR cameras.

Regardless of how you feel about the showmanship of stunt hacking, take the time to understand and learn from their root causes. While it is highly unlikely that an attacker will attempt to infiltrate your organization with a digital SLR camera (there are far easier and more subtle hacking techniques that will achieve the same goal), it is still important to invest in appropriate policies and system controls to defend vulnerable vectors.

With more people seeking futures as security researchers, it would be reasonable to assume that more bugs (in a broader range of devices and formats) will be disclosed. What may originally present as a novel flaw in, let us say, a robotic lawnmower, may become the seed vector for uncovering and launching new 0-day exploits against smart power strips in the enterprise datacenter at a later date.

Chuckle or cringe, but make sure you understand the root cause of the vulnerabilities or attack vectors behind the next over-hyped stunt hack and don’t have similar weaknesses in your enterprise.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - August 20, 2019

Monday, July 22, 2019

Digital Transformation Makes the Case for Log Retention in Cloud SIEMs

As organizations pursue their digital transformation dreams, they’ll migrate from on-premises SIEM to cloud-based SIEM. In the process of doing so, CISOs are taking a closer look at their previous security incident and event log retention policies, and revisiting past assumptions and processes.

For organizations needing to maintain a smorgasbord of industry compliance and regulatory requirements, overall event log retention will range from one year through to seven. Many organizations find that a minimum of one year meets most mandated requirements but err on the side of retaining between three to four years – depending on what their legal counsel advises.

With public cloud, data retention spans many different options, services, and price points. Backups, blob storage, “hot” access, “cold” access, etc. – there are endless ways to store and access security events and logs. With cloud storage dropping in price year-on-year, it’s cheap and easy to just store everything forever – assuming there’s no rush or requirement to inspect the stored data. But hot data, more expensive than the cold option, gives defenders the quick access they need for real-time threat hunting. Keeping data hot for SIEM use is inevitably one of the more expensive data storage options. A balance needs to be struck between having instant access to SIEM for queries and active threat hunting, and long-term regulatory-driven storage of event and log data. Can an optimal storage balance be achieved?


Widely available public threat reports for the last couple of years provide a “mean-time” to breach discovery ranging from 190 to 220 days and a breach containment window of between 60 to 100 days. Therefore, keeping 220 days of security event logs “hot” and available in a cloud SIEM would statistically only help with identifying half of an organization’s breaches. Obviously, a higher retention period makes sense – especially for organizations with less mature or less established security operations capabilities.

However, a sizable majority of SIEM-discoverable threats and correlated events are detectable in a much shorter timeframe – and rapidly detecting these breaches naturally makes it considerably more difficult for an adversary to maintain long-time persistence. For example, automatically piecing together the kill chain for an email phishing attack that led to a malware installation, that phoned home to a malicious C&C, which had then brute-forced the administrative access to a high value server is almost trivial for cloud SIEM (assuming appropriate logging was enabled). Nowadays, such a scenario (or permutation of that scenario) likely accounts for near half of all enterprise network breaches.

My advice to organizations new to cloud SIEM is to begin with a rolling window of one year’s worth of event logs while measuring both the frequency of breaches and time to mitigate. All older event logs can be stored using cheaper cloud storage options and needn’t be immediately available for threat hunting.

Depending on the security operations teams’ capacity for mitigating the events raised by cloud SIEM, it may be financially beneficial to reduce the rolling window if the team is overwhelmed with unresolvable events. I’d be hesitant to reduce that rolling window. Instead, I would recommend CISOs with under-resourced teams find and engage a managed security services provider to fill that skills gap.

A question then arises as to the value of retaining multiple years of event logs. Is multi-year log retainment purely a compliance tick-box?

While day-to-day cloud SIEM operations may focus on a one-year rolling window, it can be beneficial to organize a twice-annual threat hunt against several years of event logs using the latest available threat intelligence and indicator of compromise (IoC) information as seeds for investigation. These periodic events have two objectives: reduce your average monthly cloud SIEM operating costs (by temporarily loading and unloading the historic data) and allow teams to change mode and “deep dive” into a broader set of data while looking for “low and slow” compromises. If an older breach is detected, incrementally older event logs could be included in the quest to uncover the origin point of an intruder’s penetration or full spectrum of records accessed.

Caution over infinite event log retention may be warranted, however. If the breached organization only has a couple years of logs, versus being able to trace breach inception to, say, four years earlier, their public disclosure to customers may sound worse to some ears (including regulators). For example, disclosing “we can confirm customers over the last two years are affected” is a weaker disclosure than “customers since July 4th 2015 are affected”. Finding the sweet-spot in log retention needs to be a board-level decision.

Having moved to cloud SIEM, CISOs also need to decide what logs should be included and what log settings should be used.

Ideally, all event logs should be passed to the cloud SIEM. That is because the AI and log analytics systems powering threat detection and automated response thrive on data. Additionally, inclusion of logs from the broadest spectrum of enterprise devices and applications will help reduce detection times and remove potential false positives, which increase overall confidence in the system’s recommendations.

Most applications and networked appliances allow for different levels of logging, including scaling from error messages to alerts and error messages through to errors, warnings, status messages, and debugging information. In general, the greater the detail in the event logs, the greater the value they bring to cloud SIEM. In this way, upgrading from “normal” to “verbose” log settings can offer several threat response advantages – particularly when it comes to handling misconfigurations and criticality determination.

The symbiotic development of cloud SIEM and cloud AI innovation continues at an astounding pace. While cloud SIEM may be new for most organizations, its ability to harness the innate capabilities of public cloud are transforming security operations. Not only are threats being uncovered quicker and responses managed more efficiently, but continual advancements in the core AI makes the technology more valuable while costs of operating SIEM and storing data in the cloud continue to drop. This makes it possible for companies to make pragmatic use of the intelligent cloud by operating on a one-year window of hot data while getting value out of older data, stored cold, on twice a year threat hunts.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - July 22, 2019

Tuesday, July 2, 2019

Defending Downwind as the Cyberwar Heats up

The last few weeks have seen a substantial escalation of tensions between Iran and the US as regional cyberattacks gain pace and sophistication with Iran’s downing of a US drone, possibly leveraging its previously claimed GPS spoofing and GNSS hacking skills (to trick it into Iranian airspace) and a retaliatory US cyberattack knocking out Iranian missile control systems


While global corporations have been targeted by actors often cited as supported by or sympathetic to Iran, the escalating tensions in recent weeks will inevitably bring more repercussions as tools and tactics change with new strategic goals. Over the last decade, at other times of high tension, sympathetic malicious actors have often targeted the websites or networks of Western corporations – pursuing defacement and denial of service strategies. Recent state-level cyberattacks show actors evolving from long-cycle data exfiltration to include tactical destruction.

State sponsored attacks are increasingly focused on destruction. Holmium, a Middle Eastern actor, has been observed recently by Microsoft to target oil & gas and maritime transportation sectors – using a combination of tactics to gain access to networks, including socially engineered spear phishing operations and password spray attacks – and are increasingly associated with destructive attacks.

Many businesses may be tempted to take a “business as usual” stand but there is growing evidence that, as nation state cyber forces square off, being downwind of a festering cyberwar inevitably exposes organizations to collateral damage. 

As things heat up, organizations can expect attacks to shift from data exfiltration to data destruction and for adversarial tooling to grow in sophistication as they expose advanced tools and techniques, such as zero-day exploits, in order to gain a temporary advantage on the cyber battlefield.

Against this backdrop, corporate security teams and CISOs should focus on the following areas:

  1. Pivot SOC teams from daily worklist and ticket queue response to an active threat hunting posture. As state-sponsored attackers escalate to more advanced tools and break out cherished exploits, some attacks will become more difficult to pick up with existing signature and payload-based threat detection systems. Consequently, SOC teams will need to spend more time correlating events and logs, and hunting for new attack sequences.
  2. Prepare incident responders to investigate suspicious events earlier and to mitigate threats faster. As attackers move from exfiltration to destruction, a timely response becomes even more critical.
  3. Review the organization’s back-up strategy for all critical business data and business systems, and verify their recoverability. As the saying goes, a back-up is only as good as its last recovery. This will provide continuity in the event actors using ransomware no longer respond to payment, leaving your data unrecoverable.
  4. Update your business response plan and practice disaster recovery to build your recovery muscle memory. Plan for new threat vectors and rapid destruction of critical business systems, both internal and third-party.
  5. Double-check the basics and make sure they’re applied everywhere. Since so many successful attack vectors still rely on social engineering and password guessing, use anti-phishing and multi-factor authentication (MFA) as front-line defenses for the cyberwar. Every privileged account throughout the organization and those entrusted to “trusted” supplier access should be using MFA by default.
  6. Engage directly with your preferred security providers and operationalize any new TTPs and indicators associated with Middle Eastern attack operators that they can share with you. Make sure that your hunting tools account for the latest threat intelligence and are capable of alerting the right teams should a threat surface.
  7. For organizations that have adopted cyber-insurance policies to cover business threats that cannot be countered with technology, double-check which and what “acts of war” are covered.

While implementing the above advice will place your organization on a better “cyberwar footing”, history shows that even well-resourced businesses targeted by Iranian state-sponsored groups fall victim to these attacks. Fortunately, there’s a silver lining in the storm clouds. Teaming up in-house security teams with public cloud providers puts companies in a much better position to respond to and counter such threats because doing so lets them leverage the massively scalable capabilities of the cloud provider’s infrastructure and the depth of security expertise from additional responders. For this reason, organizations should consider which critical business systems could be duplicated or moved for continuity and recovery purposes to the cloud, and in the process augment their existing on-premises threat response.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - July 2, 2019

Tuesday, June 11, 2019

The Symbiosis Between Public Cloud and MSSPs

To the surprise of many, public cloud appears to be driving a renaissance in adoption and advancement of managed security service providers (MSSP).

For several years, the major public cloud providers have settled upon a regular rhythm of rolling out new security features for inclusion in their workload management tooling – adding new detections and alerting capabilities that, for want of a better description, are designed to help subscribers clean up an expanding corpus of horrible little mistakes that expose confidential information or make it easy for an attacker to abuse valuable resources and steal intellectual property. To my mind, this incremental rollout of embedded security features represents perhaps the single most valuable advantage of moving to the cloud.


Many of these security features are simple and non-intrusive. For example, they could alert the subscriber that they just created a publicly accessible data storage device that is using a poor administrator password, or that they’re about to spin up a virtual machine (VM) that hasn’t been patched or updated in nine months. Moving beyond alerts, the cloud security tooling could also propose (or force – if enforcing compliance mandate) that both a stronger password be used and that multi-factor authentication be applied by clicking a button or, in the case of a dated VM, auto-patch the OS and installing an updated security suite on the image. 

Getting these security basics done right and applied consistently across millions of subscribers and tens of millions of workloads has, year over year, proved that businesses operating in the public cloud are more secure than those that are solely on-premises. Combining the cloud’s security benefits with MSSP solutions unlocks even greater value, the most common of which are:

Small and medium businesses (SMB), prior to moving to the cloud, were lucky to have a couple of IT support staff who probably between them managed three or four security technologies (e.g. anti-virus, firewall, VPN, and an anti-phishing gateway). Upon moving to the cloud, the IT team are presented with 20+ default running security services and another 50+ security product options available within a single clicks reach, and are simply overwhelmed by the volume of technology presented to them and the responsibility of managing such a diverse portfolio of security products.

The move to the cloud is not the flick of a switch, but a journey. The company’s in-house security team must continue to support the legacy on-premises security technology while learning and mastering an even larger set of cloud-based security options and technologies. These teams are stretched too thin and cannot afford the time to “retrain” for the cloud.

Businesses embracing DevOps strive to optimize value and increase the pace of innovation in the cloud. Operationalizing a DevOps culture typically requires the business to re-orient their internal security team and have them master SecDevOps. As in-house security expertise focuses on SecDevOps, daily security operational tasks and incident response require additional resourcing.

Locating, hiring, and retaining security talent is becoming more difficult – especially for SMBs. Companies moving to the cloud typically either hire new security expertise to carry the organization into the cloud or retrain their smartest and most valuable in-house security talent to try to backfill those “legacy” security roles.

Traditionally, MSSPs value lay in their ability to manage a portfolio of security products that they sold to and installed into their customers’ environments. To ensure service level quality and depth of knowledge, the most successful MSSPs would be highly selective and optimize the portfolio of security products they could support.

As their customers move workloads to the public cloud, larger MSSPs are retraining their technical teams in the cloud-native security offerings from the top public cloud providers. In tandem, the MSSPs are updating their internally developed SOC, NOC, and incident handling tools to embrace the default public cloud provider’s APIs and security products. 

At the same time, MSSPs, appear to be doing better with hiring and retaining security expertise than SMBs. Not only are they able to pay higher salaries but, perhaps more importantly, they’re able to provide the career development paths not present in smaller businesses through a diverse spectrum of security challenges spread over multiple customer environments. 

The parallel growth of default public cloud security capabilities and MSSP adoption offers a solution for the dearth of entry level information security personnel and access to experienced incident responders. Combining cloud efficiencies with MSSP delivery creates advanced capabilities beyond that on-premises only defense can achieve.

Smart MSSPs are embracing cloud operations for their own optimizations and service delivery. Many are taking advantage of the built-in AI and elastic compute capabilities to provide more advanced and personalized security services to customers – without needing to scale their pool of human experts. In this way businesses embracing the efficiencies of the public cloud and on-demand security expertise gain a critical advantage in working around the shortage of security professionals.

Today we have less horses from a century ago and consequently less trained farriers but more qualified welders. As businesses move to the cloud and embrace MSSP, this will make it possible to deliver advanced capabilities that help fill entry level security requirements which account for the majority of security vacancies around the world. As result, existing defenders can work on higher level problems, enabling companies to cover more ground.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - June 11, 2019

Tuesday, May 21, 2019

From APES to Bespoke Security Automated as a Service

Many of the most innovative security start-ups I come across share a common heritage – their core product evolved from a need to automate the delivery of an advanced service that had begun as a boutique or specialized consulting offering. Start-ups with this legacy tend to have bypassed the “feature looking for a problem” phase that many others struggle with and often launch their products on day-one alongside a parade of satisfied marque accounts.

While there isn’t a universal formula for success, over my years delivering boutique professional security services, I have been very lucky to encounter that product evolution several times, usually resulting from consultants intelligently automating the repetitive parts of their jobs away and creating a new class of product.

For example, around the turn of the millennium, when penetration testing came to the fore as the cutting edge in security consulting, the need for automating away the drudgery of port scans and vulnerability scanning was obvious. The first foray led to tooling that freed up consultants to focus on the “art” of bug hunting and recognition that some customers needs were satisfied with those basic capabilities. During my time at Internet Security Systems, that first automation came to be known as the “monkey scan” – because of how easy it was to run. Of course, once the marketing team got wind of customers purchasing the scanning service, a more sensible name was needed and so Automated Perimeter and Enterprise Scanner (APES) was born. From humble beginnings, that X-Force managed service line business grew and, through acquisition, its legacy continues today as part of IBM’s Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP) business. 


Automation of repetitive consulting tasks is an obvious and critical element, but so too is the need to ensure consistency and exhaustive completion of delivery. Along my own journey I’ve seen former colleagues spawn companies such as SPI Dynamics and PortSwigger Web Security (i.e. Burp Proxy) to bring to market new web application security testing tools, Continuum Security SL to solve SDLC-based threat modelling and risk management challenges, Endgame to kickstart the nation-state threat intelligence market, and AttackIQ to construct and define the Attack and Breach Simulation category – all springing from the imagination of talented consultants looking to make life just a little bit easier.

To understand what the next innovative security technology will be, we should look closely at the premium service offerings from specialized services boutique consulting companies and pay attention to those services that have a documented and repeatable methodology. While many young specialist service lines may present themselves as more “art” than “science” – the turning point comes with the development and enforcement of a standardized methodology.

A service methodology ensures consistency of delivery. Consistency means that the differentiated elements of the service can be, or must be, repeatable. If they are repeatable, then they almost always can be automated. If key elements of the service are automatable, then they can be productized. 

The depth of service that automation can deliver roughly defines whether the product will be most effectively delivered as a managed security service, a self-service SaaS offering, or a stand-alone product.

In the past, that evolution from boutique consulting service to top-right corner market leading product has taken a few years – typically three years for productization and market awareness, then another three to five before analysts label and assign a market segment. I anticipate that more consulting services will mature into products and the overall pace will increase over coming years because public cloud and AI are rapidly accelerating the gestation of these products. 

Just as many of the most innovative companies launch as cloud-native, security consultants have similarly embraced and applied their expertise in cloud environments. Consultants were often constraint bound by their clients’ hardware and physical locations. Now, when consultants need to automate repetitive tasks (e.g. enumerating APIs, fuzzing payloads, etc.) or to test a hypothesis, they already have the tools in front of them – with no energy lost in applying them. This greatly shortens the time needed to prototype new cross-client solution sets and capabilities.

But automation will only go so far. A successful product needs to capture and distill the expertise and experience that a specialist consultant applies when interpreting the output of all those automated tasks. This is where advances in AI are accelerating the product creation process and transforming managed services businesses.

Off-the-shelf AI libraries and cloud services are allowing innovators to move from linear content creation modes (e.g., each threat requires a unique signature) and decades-old if-then-else logic to training classifier systems capable of identifying and labeling swathes of the problem space they are seeking to solve, and teaching systems to learn new responses directly from the actions the consultants  are already undertaking to solve their customers’ problems.

In my time as a CISO for organizations that often required security consulting expertise, I’ve engaged in reviewing the methodology that consultants will be applying to my systems. Lack of a detailed methodology will inevitably lead to inconsistent results and lack of repeatability, the death knell of compliance. When reviewing a proposed methodology, a CISO should also ask about the automation process framework and whether those automated tasks can be separated from consultant billing. This could possibly reduce overall job costs, but also prompts your consulting partners to accelerate an important services transition into a more versatile product.

For my former consulting brethren, take a critical look at the innovative services you are delivering. Stop playing the “art” card and instead focus on the detailed methodology that’ll promote repeatability and confidence in your service. From there, invest time in applying the resources of public cloud to bring automation, scalability, and AI to solving the given problem as a platform for all customers – past, present, and future.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - May 21, 2019

Tuesday, April 30, 2019

To Reach SIEM’s Promise, Take a Lesson From World War II

With two of the largest public cloud providers having launched their cloud Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) products and an inevitability that the remainder of the top 5 cloud providers will launch their own permutations some time this year, 2019 is clearly the year of the cloud SIEM.

For an on-premises technology that has been cursed with a couple decades of over-promising, under-achieving, and eye-watering cost escalation, modernizing SIEM into a cloud native security technology is a watershed moment for the InfoSec community.

The promise of finally being able to analyze all the logs, intelligence, and security data of an enterprise in real-time opens the door to many great and obvious things. We can let the SIEM vendors shout about all the obvious defensive value cloud SIEM brings. Instead, I’d like to focus on a less obvious but arguably more valuable long-term contribution that a fully capable cloud SIEM brings to enterprise defense.

Assuming an enterprise invests in bringing all their network logs, system events, flow telemetry, and security events and alerts together into the SIEM, businesses will finally be able to track threats as they propagate in an environment. Most importantly, they’ll be able to easily identify and map the “hotspots” of penetration and compromise, and remedy accordingly.

A unified view will also allow analysts and security professionals to pinpoint the spots where compromises remain hidden from peering eyes. As enterprises strive to deploy and manage an arsenal of threat detection, configuration management, and incident response tools in increasingly dynamic environments, visibility and coverage wax and wane with each employee addition, wireless router hook-up, application installation, or SaaS business connection. Those gaps, whether temporary or permanent, tend to attract an unfair share of compromise and harm.

In World War II, a gentleman by the name of Abraham Wald was a member of Columbia University’s Statistical Research Group (SRG). One problem SRG was tasked with was examining the distribution of damage to returning aircraft and advise on how to minimize bomber losses to enemy fire. A premise of the research was that the areas of bombers that were most damaged and therefore susceptible to flak should be redesigned and made more robust. Wald noted that such a study was biased to only aircrafts that survived their missions and, if you were to assume that damage was more uniformly distributed to all aircrafts, those that returned had actually been hit in the less vulnerable parts. By mapping the damage done to the surviving aircraft, the “undamaged” areas represented the most vulnerable parts of the aircrafts that didn’t survive to return.


Wald’s revelations and work were seminal in the early days of Operational Research – a discipline of applying advanced analytical methods to help make better decisions. I expect cloud SIEM and the integration of AI systems to usher Operational Research and its associated disciplines into the information security sector. Securing an enterprise is a highly complex and dynamic problem and, because Operational Research is focused on optimizing solutions for complex decision-making problems, it is well suited to finding solutions that balance the multi-faceted aspects of business continuity and risk.

As we’re in the early days for cloud SIEM, I’ve yet to see much in the area of employing native AI to address the cold-spots in enterprise threat visibility. The focus to-date is applying AI in threat hunting and automating the reconstruction of kill chain associated with an in-progress attack and supplementing that visualization with related threat intelligence and historical data artifacts.

Putting on a forecasting hat, I expect much of the immediate adoption and growth of cloud SIEM will be driven by desire to realize the promises of on-premises SIEM, in particular, using supervised-learning systems to automate the detection and mitigation of the threats that have pestered security operations teams for twenty-plus years. Infusing SIEM natively on the cloud provider’s platform also creates end to end visibility into security related events inside a business’ environment and pieces in valuable intelligence from the cloud provider’s operations – thereby harnessing the “cloud effects” of collective intelligence and removing the classic requirement for a “patient zero” to initiate an informed response.

What I hope is, once engineering teams have matured those hunting and mitigation capabilities by weaving in AI decision systems and real-time data processing, the “science” of information security can finally come up for air and move forward.

Leveraging the inherent power and scale of public cloud for real-time analytics of enterprise security data at streaming rates means that we’re at the cusp of finally calculating the ROI of each security technology deployed inside an enterprise. That alone should have many CISOs and CFOs jumping for joy. With all the enterprise security data flowing to one place, the cloud SIEM also becomes the anchor for IT operations – such as tracking the “meantime between failures” (MTBF) of protected systems, providing robustness metrics for software assets and system updates, and surfacing the latent risks of the environments being monitored.

75 years may separate War World II from cloud SIEM, but we’re on the cusp of being able to apply the hard-earned learnings from Abraham Wald in our latest adversarial conflict – the cyberwar.

-- Gunter Ollmann

First Published: SecurityWeek - April 30, 2019